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Abstract
Terrorist groups have repeatedly used suicide attacks in an attempt to achieve their strategic objectives. There is minimal argument that these groups demonstrate a profound understanding of both the strategic and tactical levels of war, however there is little mention of their understanding of the operational level of war. An analysis of suicide terror attacks over the past 25 years indicates that developed terrorist groups (including Al Qaeda and many others) understand the operational level and practice the tenets of operational art quite well. This knowledge is crucial in developing a response to counter what has become a prevalent and effective terrorist tactic. This paper provides background information on the development of the suicide attack as an effective terrorist tactic. It analyzes several terrorist groups and their utilization of suicide attacks to achieve strategic objectives. Finally, the paper reaches conclusions about the groups' awareness and use of operational art concepts and provides recommendations for assisting the development of a counterterrorism game plan.
INTRODUCTION
"Terrorising you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. . . . It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight, Jihad, in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers. . . . These youths know that:
if one is not to be killed one will die (any way) and the most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah." 1 The fatwa ("a religious opinion on Islamic law") 2 issued by Osama bin Laden in February 1996 specifically alludes to the use of martyrdom operations ("killed in the way of Allah") in his declaration of war against the United States. Since 1983, terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
and Chechen rebels (among many others) have utilized suicide terror attacks as a tactic to achieve their strategic objectives. successes have also demonstrated an understanding of the basic tenets of operational art, and practice them to achieve their objectives.
BACKGROUND
The first terrorist attacks during which an individual assailant was not expected to survive occurred in the first century AD. Since then the Jewish Zealots, Thugs of India, and
Ismaili Assassins have all utilized tactics requiring an assailant to enter a heavily defended area in order to attack a high priority target (usually a high-ranking political or military leader), with the expectation that the assailant would not survive the attack. 5 The assailant's death was a not a prerequisite for the success of the attack; however the tactic usually resulted in the assailant being killed by forces defending the target. More recently, Japanese
Kamikaze attacks in World War II demonstrated that a large military force may resort to suicide tactics in the interest of survival. In the modern age of terrorism, the term "suicide attack" is defined as "a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission."
6
The operations of terrorist groups are motivated by two ideologies: religion and nationalism. The overwhelming majority of suicide attacks since 1983 are perpetrated by Muslim groups, like Al Qaeda, with religious motivations; however the LTTE in Sri Lanka, with purely nationalistic objectives, also conducts a significant number of suicide attacks. 5. For a history of organizations using suicidal attacks prior to 1983, see Bloom, Dying to Kill, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] with another unconventional attack designed to cause mass casualties.
Al Qaeda attempts to coordinate with other terrorist groups sharing similar ideology and sequence its operations in order to achieve its strategic objectives, demonstrating an understanding of the basic tenets of operational art. Al Qaeda also clearly understands and implements at least four of the six operational functions, enabling the effective planning and execution of suicide terror attacks around the globe.
SUICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND PALESTINE
Israel, and nations in the region that support its existence, has been the target of suicide attacks by pro-Palestinian groups since the early 1980s. 
SUICIDE ATTACKS PERPETRATED BY THE LTTE
The LTTE, PKK, Chechen rebels, and Iraqi insurgents all have nationalist strategic objectives similar to the anti-Israeli groups. They are fighting to achieve independent states distinctly different from a perceived aggressor. The LTTE, which is attempting to gain an independent state on the island of Sri Lanka, "is unequivocally the most effective and brutal terrorist organization ever to utilize suicide terrorism."
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Under leader Villupilai Prabhakaran, the LTTE (a.k.a. the Tamil Tigers) uses a structured hierarchical command and control system, akin to a national military. There are distinct differences between units, which are divided by military specialty. The Tamil Tigers utilize a navy, an air force, a child soldier division, a female soldier division, and a distinct The leaders of these military divisions would be considered the LTTE operational leadership.
They are responsible for planning and coordinating joint attacks between naval forces and suicide forces and have the most direct influence on operations.
The LTTE has robust intelligence capabilities, which, in violation of United Nations groups. Sunni and Ba'ath Party radicals may simply be using the proven tactic of suicide bombing to achieve their strategic objectives of destabilizing the new Iraqi government and ultimately causing the departure of foreigners from Iraqi soil. Upon consideration of the intelligence and protection measures required to achieve success, it is tenable that these organizations contain operational leaders who combine the functions and elements of operational art to achieve maximum effect.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Operational security is inherent in the suicide attack. The success of the operation depends on the death of the attacker, who will not be captured and will not be subject to interrogation by enemy forces. In the LTTE, operatives carry a cyanide capsule and, in case of capture, are directed to commit suicide to maintain the security of the organization. Al Qaeda clearly employs several operational functions, including C2, intelligence, fires, and protection. They also exhibit an understanding of sequencing and combining operations, fusing their knowledge and conducting joint attacks to achieve maximum effect. Counterterrorism experts must find a way to minimize the influence of radical Islamist ideology through education. Prospective suicide bombers must be made aware that the radical ideology is not the sole ideology.
The insurgency in Iraq is also an extremely wicked problem. Physical security measures have been effective in reducing the number of attacks aimed at military targets, but soft civilian targets have since taken the brunt of the damage. If a suicide bombing succeeds and a particular group does not step forward to claim the attack, it is nearly impossible to determine which group conducted it. This is a large part of the problem in Iraq. Here again, HUMINT resources are needed to determine which group executed the attack and where its operational level exists. Once that level is identified, counterterrorism professionals stand a chance of disrupting the future operations of a specific group.
When comparing a suicide terrorist group's operational level to that of a national military, one must avoid dismissing the small size of the terrorist tactical element. "The suicide attack is usually carried out by a lone attacker; however, the execution of the attack involves many members of the terror organization, each of whom has designated tasks that ultimately enable the action of the lone attacker. Thus, the suicide attack must not be regarded as the act of an individual." 63 It is the functions performed above the tactical element and ultimately the strategic objectives of the group that establish the operational level within a terrorist group. It is a level that is difficult to identify, yet if it can be found and exploited by HUMINT resources, will be critical to the success of counterterrorism campaigns.
63. Shay, The Shahids, 57.
